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1 Introduction
The question of whether aliates of multinational companies outperform purely domestic rms has attracted
huge attention. The internalization literature (Dunning, 1981; Caves, 2007) stresses that multinational rms
possess sophisticated assets which domestic rms lack, including managerial expertise, process and production
technologies or brand names. Since these assets are transferred to the foreign aliates, it is natural to expect
that foreign rms should perform better than their domestic competitors. On the other hand, there exists a well-
developed management literature (Tomassen & Benito, 2009; Buckley & Strange, 2011; Filatotchev & Wright,
2011) which stresses the role of assimilation and governance costs that multinational enterprises (MNEs) incur
when they operate a subsidiary in a foreign country. According to this literature, internal transaction costs are
a serious obstacle for the well-functioning of aliates.
The nal performance of foreign rms can be seen as the outcome of these two contrasting forces. Despite
a large number of studies, a clear consensus on whether foreign rms do perform better than domestic ones
has not been reached. In this paper, we introduce a new dimension into this discussion. In particular, we
allow for geographic heterogeneity in the eect of foreign ownership on productivity. While there exists a well
developed literature analyzing the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) location (Head et al., 1995;
Wei et al., 1999; Basile, 2004; Du et al., 2008), to the best of our knowledge there is no paper in the literature
assessing whether there is spatial heterogeneity in the productivity of foreign owned rms, and what are the
driving forces. This is quite surprising. Conceding that FDI location is inuenced by local factors makes it
natural to ask whether returns to foreign investment dier across space. A suitable way to look at this issue
is to investigate the behavior of a revenue-based measure of total factor productivity (TFP) in foreign owned
rms.
Employing Italian rm level data, we show that the productivity eect of foreign ownership depends on the
stock of civic capital in the area where the rm is located.1 Specically, in areas with a low endowment of
civic capital the eect of foreign ownership on productivity is less favorable. On the contrary, as the stock of
civic capital increases, so does the productivity of foreign aliates. The economic intuition behind this result
is that, by reducing the scope of opportunistic behavior, civic capital alleviates agency problems and enhances
cooperation in intra-rm interactions (Ichino & Maggi, 2000; Bloom et al., 2012). Foreign aliates, in turn, are
supposed to benet more from this shield against overly self-interested behavior than purely domestic rms.
The reason is that the geographically dispersed operations of MNEs and the resulting spatial separation of
individuals within the MNE network enlarge the potential incidence of opportunistic behavior. For example,
agency problems are likely to be exacerbated when the principal (shareholder) and the agent (local managers
and employees) are located in dierent countries (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As
a consequence, we expect that in areas where civic capital is low the disadvantages of foreign ownership are
more severe, and performance worsens. On the contrary, the performance of an aliate located in an area with
1We avoid using the somewhat loaded term of social capital. Rather, we adopt the concept of civic capital proposed by
Guiso et al. (2011). We describe this concept in section 2.2.
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a high endowment of civic capital is enhanced, as foreign investors encounter less problems of governance and
assimilation.
Our estimation strategy rests on a two-stage approach. In the rst stage we estimate a revenue-based
measure of total factor productivity by the semi-parametric approach proposed by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003).
In the second stage, we employ a rst-dierencing approach where the change in rm productivity is regressed,
among others, on our variable of interest, namely the interaction between a dummy identifying the change in
foreign ownership status and the stock of local civic capital. By estimating the regression in rst dierences
we explicitly take unobserved heterogeneity at the rm level into account. We also allow for industry, province,
and time-specic trends.
Focusing on Italy is particularly convenient for our exercise, because the intense investigation of civic cap-
ital in this country (Baneld, 1958; Putnam et al., 1993; Guiso et al., 2004) has produced a range of indirect
measures of civic capital. Specically, as in Guiso et al. (2004) and de Blasio & Nuzzo (2010), we proxy civic
capital by electoral turnout in referenda, the number of blood donations, and the number of volunteers in
non-prot organizations per province. In order to minimize problems of measurement error, we also extract the
rst principal component out of these three measures.
Our ndings complement the existing literature along several lines. First, we extend the branch of studies
which has looked at performance dierentials between domestic rms and foreign aliates. This question
has been analyzed with data from dierent countries, including the U.K. (Grith, 1999; Conyon et al., 2002;
Harris & Robinson, 2002), Italy (Benfratello & Sembenelli, 2006), Germany (Temouri et al., 2008), Slovenia
(Salis, 2008), Norway (Balsvik & Haller, 2010), and Sweden (Bandick, 2011). Each of these studies implicitly
assumes that the governance costs that foreign aliates face do not vary geographically. In contrast, our study
underlines the importance of local informal norms and institutions, in particular the stock of civic capital, and
shows that an adverse eect of foreign acquisitions on productivity can be found in some selected areas.
Second, the international business literature recently stressed the role of governance costs in determin-
ing the performance of foreign rms. Analyzing the performance of foreign subsidiaries owned by Norwegian
multinationals, Tomassen & Benito (2009) nd that governance costs related to bargaining, monitoring and
maladaptation signicantly reduce the aliates' performance. Their paper diers from ours because they use a
questionnaire from 160 foreign aliates belonging to Norwegian parent companies, and because the basic vari-
ables are multi-item variables based on a qualitative assessment by the respondent. Moreover, dierently from
them, we work out the role of the \civic environment" in which the aliate is embedded for the determination
of performance.
Two general caveats can be made on our analysis. The rst point concerns the mode of entry of MNEs.
They can enter a foreign market either through the construction of a new plant (greeneld investment), or by
acquiring a certain amount of equities of an existing plant (browneld investment).2 In line with the bulk of
the literature analyzing the eect of foreign ownership, this paper focuses on browneld acquisitions, as in this
2The usual convention is to identify a foreign direct investment when foreign persons come to hold at least 10% of the share of
equities.
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case it is easier to identify the direct impact of the ownership change on performance.
The second important point to keep in mind is that the literature on foreign rms performance often looks at
the impact of the ownership change in the short run. Some papers (Conyon et al., 2002; Benfratello & Sembenelli,
2006) analyze the eect of foreign ownership on productivity in the same year the change in ownership status
takes place. Other papers (Harris & Robinson, 2002; Salis, 2008; Balsvik & Haller, 2010; Bandick, 2011) fol-
low the rm up to few years after the acquisition. In this respect, our paper is not an exception, because we
look at productivity changes over a three-year period of time. Consequently, we agree with Harris & Robinson
(2003) that over a longer time horizon the performance of foreign rms may be signicantly better than that
of domestic rms, because it may take time to fully exploit the advantages of foreign ownership.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we rst review the literature about the per-
formance of foreign rms, and then outline the mechanism by which civic capital impacts on this. Section 3
presents the data, section 4 the methodological approach, section 5 the main results, while section 6 discusses
the robustness of the analysis and some extensions. In section 7 we do instrumental variable regressions. Finally,
section 8 concludes.
2 Civic capital and the performance of foreign rms: assessing the
link
2.1 The impact of foreign ownership on performance
2.1.1 Foreign ownership and performance: theoretical arguments
Several studies have addressed the issue of whether there is a performance gap between foreign and domestic
rms, both theoretically and empirically. The main theoretical underpinning lies in the so-called internalization
theory (Dunning, 1981; Caves, 2007), according to which foreign aliates established in host countries receive
superior intangible assets coming from the parent company, usually in the form of technological and managerial
know-how, and brand names. This leads to a signicant rise in the productivity of the receiving rms. A related
argument suggesting a positive eect of acquisitions (both domestic and foreign) on productivity emphasizes
the possibility to improve the match between the acquiring and the target rm, and to fully exploit the target's
prot opportunities (Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1987).
Nevertheless, the rise in productivity due to foreign ownership can be counteracted by other factors. As the
process of rm restructuring and reorganization prompted by the acquisition unfolds, there are obstacles that
make the acquisition less favorable, at least in the short run. Harris & Robinson (2002) argue that \browneld
entry incurs costs through having to establish internal trust post-acquisition in the new organization, and
through the cost of adapting the production facility of the acquired plant. Such costs are likely to be incurred
in the immediate post-acquisition phase". In other terms, there are expenses (monetary and not) stemming
from the eort to build mutual cooperation and trust between new foreign shareholders and local managers and
workers, and from the need to coordinate and restructure the production process of the aliate. Going deeper
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into the origin of these costs, three interrelated determinants of transaction costs within large organizations in
general, and multinational rms in particular have been stressed by the business literature (Buckley & Carter,
1996; Buckley & Casson, 1998; Buckley & Strange, 2011). The rst concerns information and knowledge. The
relevant information for decision making is distributed among individuals within a rm. Firm organization has
to be designed in such a way as to facilitate a smooth ow of information and knowledge among its members
both within and across hierarchies. Second, the tasks required for production have to be eciently coordinated.
This requires identication of complementarity of action and coordination of the production process. Third,
rm members often pursue personal goals which are not necessarily congruent with those of the rm as a
whole. Therefore, an appropriate incentive scheme is necessary which ensures that agents take actions which
are consistent with the objectives of the rm.
The potential incidence of internal transaction costs is high in the case of multinational rms compared to
domestic owned rms. The increase stems from two factors which aect each of the above mentioned areas.
First, operating in dierent countries implies spatial separation of production facilities. This slows down the
ow of information and makes an ecient coordination of the various production tasks more cumbersome.
Moreover, asymmetric information between local managers and foreign shareholders as well as the diculty
to eectively monitor distant agents exacerbate agency problems (Buckley & Casson, 1998). In fact, local
managers and workers generally have superior knowledge of the local business environment compared to the
shareholder living in a dierent country (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). The second factor are cultural dierences
among countries. This increases and further complicates the ow of information and knowledge among foreign
aliates and headquarters (Hedlund & Nonaka, 1993; Buckley & Carter, 2002). Communication failures are
the result of diverse cultural backgrounds between the parent company and the aliate, provided that workers
in dierent countries have diering business codes and speak dierent languages. For all these reasons, we
expect the incidence of governance costs to be particularly pronounced in foreign owned rms.
2.1.2 Foreign ownership and performance: empirical evidence
Given the contrasting forces that inuence the operation of foreign aliates, it is not surprising that the
applied literature found mixed evidence on the productivity consequences of foreign ownership, with some
papers ascertaining positive eects, even in the immediate aftermath of an acquisition, and others nding zero
or even negative eects (see the review in Barba Navaretti & Venables, 2004). We now briey discuss some of
the more recent evidence in the literature concerning productivity, and, due to space constraints, we pass over
other important eects such as those on wages and total employment.
Conyon et al. (2002) document for the U.K. an increase in the level and growth of labor productivity (mea-
sured as output per worker) in the year of a foreign acquisition. These results contrast with Harris & Robinson
(2002), still for the case of the U.K., as they nd that rm performance, after a domestic or foreign acquisition,
may actually deteriorate. Consistently with this picture, Benfratello & Sembenelli (2006) get a negative point
estimate for the eect of foreign ownership on productivity in Italy, although the parameter is statistically
dierent from zero at the 10% level in one specication only, while in the rest of the specications it is not
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statistically dierent from zero.3 Salis (2008) nds that acquired Slovenian rms in 1997 and in the two subse-
quent years do not outperform their domestic counterparts in terms of productivity. He motivates his nding
with the fact that the acquisition carried out by the investing rm may be characterized by an asset seeking
motivation: in this situation, MNEs undertake FDI in order to get access to technological assets held by the
acquired rm, who has nothing to benet from the change in ownership. Quantitative evidence of the impor-
tance of governance costs on MNE performance is provided in Tomassen & Benito (2009). Using data from a
survey of 160 Norwegian MNEs, they nd a performance decline in foreign subsidiaries and indicate that nearly
40% of their variability in terms of performance can be attributed to governance costs related to bargaining,
monitoring and maladaptation. Balsvik & Haller (2010) analyze how TFP behaves when domestic plants are
acquired by foreign investors in Norway. They nd that TFP levels of plants subject to foreign acquisitions do
not dier signicantly from those of the reference group up to two years after the acquisition. Bandick (2011)
carries out an analysis with respect to a sample of Swedish rms over the period 1993-2004. He nds that, over
a four-year period, rms acquired by foreign entities undergo a positive TFP growth between 3 and 9 percent.
2.2 Civic capital, governance costs, and foreign rms
2.2.1 Civic capital and opportunism in intra-rm relationships
Relying on Guiso et al. (2011), we dene civic capital as \those persistent values and beliefs that help a group
overcome the free-rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities". This denition highlights a
negative relationship between civic capital and opportunistic behavior, as free-riding in collective endeavors is a
genuine form of opportunism. Hence, by denition, in areas where civic capital is high individual opportunism
is constrained by pro-social values and beliefs.
There is strong evidence about a negative link between the stock of civic capital in a given area and the
incidence of opportunistic behavior in intra-rm relationships. Employing data from a large Italian bank,
Ichino & Maggi (2000) analyze the determinants of shirking behavior among employees, dened as absenteeism
and misconduct. They nd that, ceteris paribus, shirking is more likely in branches in Southern Italy, compared
to Northern Italy. The most important determinant for shirking behavior is the region of birth of the employee.
Moreover, peer eects appear to be signicant, provided that there is a positive relationship between shirking at
the individual level and average shirking of coworkers in the branch. Since the South is on average endowed with
less civic capital than the North, Ichino and Maggi interpret the results as supporting evidence for Putnam's
notion that civicness hampers narrow-minded self interested behavior and improves collective outcomes. It
is important to stress that, in their analysis, civic capital exerts a role in shaping the North-South shirking
dierential in two manners that are conceptually distinct. The rst eect is through the inuence on the values
and beliefs of the individual worker, controlling for the composition of the rest of the workforce: since workers
born in the South are more likely to work in the Southern branches of the bank, this contributes to higher
3A positive signicant eect is found when they account for the nationality of the foreign investor. In the case of rms which
become owned by a U.S. company, a surge in productivity is associated to the ownership change.
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shirking in the South. The second eect is through the inuence on the values and beliefs of coworkers, keeping
constant the worker's individual background: since it is in the Southern branches that is more likely to be
surrounded by peers born in the South, this is an additional reason to expect higher shirking in the South,
although it is quantitatively less important than the rst in explaining the shirking dierential.
Our approach is also related to Spagnolo (1999), where it is acknowledged that civic (social) capital is \an
input for the production process, able to generate cooperation, eort in teams, productivity in organizations,
and eventually growth". The basic idea of his theoretical framework (which can be seen as an extension of
the standard model of collusion with multimarket contact) is that civic capital and social relations can sustain
cooperation within teams in private organizations.
2.2.2 Other determinants of the rm-level degree of opportunism
Several studies have argued that some specic rm policies, such as team performance monitoring and incentive
schemes, can enhance cooperation among rm members (see, for example, Rob & Zemsky, 2002). Unfortunately,
due to the lack of data at the rm-level, we do not control for all these things that could possibly aect intra-rm
relationships. The same is true for other idiosyncratic rm-specic factors that may arise in our framework,
such as whether the acquisition was friendly or hostile.
However, from a purely quantitative point of view, there is a sense in the literature in which the provincial
stock of civic capital might be more important than rm-specic corporate policies or corporate culture in
shaping the success of foreign acquisitions. For example, Weber et al. (1996) found that, in international
acquisitions, national culture dierentials better predict the success of the operation than corporate culture
dierentials, where the term national culture refers to deep values and beliefs (e.g., degree of individualism),
while corporate culture is dened as the attitudes and behaviors shared by senior managers regarding appropriate
business practices. Bloom et al. (2012) show that the extent to which headquarters of MNEs delegate decision
rights to aliates is determined by the level of bilateral trust between the two countries. We believe that the
concept of civic capital plays a role in foreign acquisitions similar to the national culture dierential. Nonetheless,
our analysis makes a step forward because we claim that, even within the same destination country (Italy),
the spatial variation in deep cultural traits at a detailed spatial scale is big enough to cause a considerable
variability in foreign rms performance.
2.2.3 Testable predictions
In the case of vertical FDI (i.e., FDI aimed at oshoring some phase of the production process) MNEs expand
abroad through foreign acquisitions whenever market agreements with foreign producers are too costly or too
risky. For example, imperfect property rights protection in the foreign country could lead to prots' loss due
to the imitation of the products. In addition, market relationships between the MNE and foreign producers
may suer from a wide range of imperfections due to contractual incompleteness. While the internalization of
operations through foreign aliates mitigates transaction costs inherent in arm's length relationships, there are
costs of governing the various activities within the MNE that increase. We have discussed the sources of these
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costs in section 2.1. In the case of horizontal FDI (i.e., FDI aimed at replicating abroad the entire production
process) MNEs expand abroad through foreign acquisitions whenever exporting is less protable than FDI. This
happens when barriers to trade are large. But also for this type of FDI the post-acquisition governing of foreign
subsidiaries is subject to the same serious obstacles.
In each type of relationship where the potential incidence of governance costs rises (information and knowl-
edge processing, tasks coordination, personal goals coordination) civic capital plays a mediating role, that
mitigates the potentially adverse eect of foreign ownership. The ow of information and the sharing of knowl-
edge between the parent company and the Italian aliate is smoother where civic capital is high, as agents are
less opportunistic and they avoid making a strategic use of information. Moreover, since civic capital hampers
narrow-minded self-interested behavior in collective endeavors we also expect that the coordination of tasks
either with headquarters or within the aliate is easier. Finally, there is also a congruence eect of civic capital
on the personal goals of employees on the one side and the MNE corporate objectives on the other, because
the attitude to cooperate in favor of collective endeavors is more intense in foreign owned plants located where
civic capital is high. Consequently, the main testable hypothesis of our framework is the following.
Prediction 1. The actual rise in governance costs due to foreign ownership should be stronger where civic
capital is low. This implies that the eect of foreign ownership on productivity is less favorable in areas where
civic capital is low. As the level of local civic capital increases, the scope for information, coordination, and
monitoring hazards is reduced, making the governance of foreign aliates easier and improving productivity.
In Figure 1 we propose a simple scheme to exemplify the conceptual framework we have in mind.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
As discussed before, the theory of MNE activity predicts that, upon a foreign acquisition, managerial and
organizational know-how is transferred from the parent company to aliates. We also provide a direct test of
this fact, relating it to the level of civic capital in the following manner.
New managerial and organizational practices are among the valuable proprietary assets that are transferred
from the parent company to the foreign aliate upon a foreign acquisition. These assets are characterized by a
strong degree of intangibility and specicity, in terms of skills and informal routines held by MNE employees,
that make it dicult to sell or contract upon them (Caves, 2007). This is exactly the reason why the MNE
nds it advantageous to exploit these assets in the context of a foreign investment, that guarantees common
ownership, instead of an arm's length transaction (sale or lease) of this know-how with a foreign plant that
maintains independence.
Because of intangibility and specicity, the extent to which these new practices are absorbed and imple-
mented in the subsidiary comes to depend on the same factors that aect governance and assimilation costs,
namely the need for information and knowledge ows, tasks coordination, and congruence in the agents objec-
tives. The know-how required for the new managerial arrangements diuses more easily from headquarters to
employees if civic capital is high, as agents are arguably less prone to make a strategic use of information. In
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addition, civic capital hampers narrow-minded self-interested behavior in collective endeavors, and this facili-
tates the aliate reorganization of tasks. Finally, civic capital favors the congruence of personal goals of local
managers and employees on the one side and the MNE corporate objectives on the other, and this is another
factor that allows to put into eect managerial innovations, since employees are presumably more eager to
pursue the goals of the new owners. Summing up, in areas where civic capital is low, the eective transmission
and implementation from headquarters to aliates of new managerial-organizational practices is hampered. On
the contrary, it should be easier to adopt them where civic capital is high.
Prediction 2. The implementation of managerial-organizational improvements due to foreign ownership is
more likely in areas where civic capital is high. As the level of local civic capital decreases, the scope for
information, coordination, and monitoring hazards is increased, making more cumbersome the adoption of this
type of MNE proprietary asset.
A last important qualication concerns the timing of managerial improvements. It is reasonable to believe
that the transfer and the implementation of new organizational practices does not happen immediately after
the acquisition is nalized, but instead takes some time to materialize. We are going to take this into account
in our empirical analysis.
3 Data description
3.1 The UniCredit Survey
We work with the 7th (1995-1997), 8th (1998-2000), and 9th (2001-2003) waves of \Indagine sulle imprese
manifatturiere" (the Survey of manufacturing rms). This survey was carried out by Mediocredito Centrale,
now part of UniCredit Group, one of the largest Italian banks.4 Each wave covers three years. Overall, the
time span that we consider ranges from 1995 until 2003. Moreover, we complement this core data set with the
10th (2004-2006) wave to retrieve the one period lead of the managerial-organizational innovations variable for
rms that are sampled both in the 9th and 10th waves (a time period is the three-year interval covered by each
wave).5
The data set encompasses the universe of Italian manufacturing rms with more than 500 employees, as well
as a stratied and rotating sample of smaller rms. Half of the rms are replaced by new rms in subsequent
waves. The choice of the rms to be dropped is random but tries to maintain the structure of stratication. The
minimum size of rms in the three waves are 10 employees. In the survey, rms are asked to provide detailed
information about their ownership structure, labor force, R&D activity, internationalization and nance. The
information from the survey is then combined with yearly balance sheet data from Bureau van Dijk's AIDA
4The quality and reliability of the data set are documented by the fact that papers employing this survey have already been
published in peer-reviewed journals (see, for example, Angelini & Generale, 2008; Benfratello et al., 2008; Casaburi & Minerva,
2011).
5We will be more specic about this variable in section 6.4.
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data set, enabling us to work with a rich rm-level data set.6
In the survey, rms are asked to report their ownership structure just once in each wave, with reference to
the last year of the wave. For this reason, in the nal sample we keep only observations from the years 1997,
2000, and 2003 (the last years of each wave) so that the full set of information is available. Moreover, in order
to allow the implementation of panel techniques with an adequate number of observations, we keep only rms
which are surveyed in two consecutive waves at least. Concerning the denition of a foreign aliate, in the
baseline analysis we classify a rm as foreign owned if at least 10% of the equities is held by a single foreign
person. In the paper, we also consider other thresholds (30% and 50%, respectively) for the identication of
foreign ownership, to check whether our results are sensitive to the particular share chosen. In the data set rms
can experience the following two changes in ownership status over time: they can start being foreign owned
when the equities held by a foreigner exceed a certain threshold (be it 10%, 30% or 50%, we call this a start
event); they can stop being foreign owned, thus becoming domestic owned, when the amount of equities held by
a foreigner goes below the threshold (we call this a stop event). Given that rms are surveyed for a maximum
of three waves, some of them may experience multiple changes in the foreign ownership status (from domestic
to foreign and then back to domestic or, viceversa, from foreign to domestic and then again to foreign).7 Some
rms are always domestic over the observed lapse of time, while others are always foreign.
After removing outliers we end up with an unbalanced panel of approximately 1600 rms.8 Calculating rst
dierences gives 1954 observations. As to the events that characterize the change in ownership status in our
data set, with a threshold set at 10% to identify foreign ownership, we have 73 start events, and 40 stop events.
The number of rms experiencing a start-stop pattern is 16. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for some
rm-level performance measures before and after the changes in ownership.
[Table 1 about here]
The table shows that both changes in ownership structure are associated with a decrease in performance
over a three-year period. For example, if a rm starts to be a foreign aliate during a certain wave, value added
per worker goes down by 41% on average in the last year of the wave where the change occurred with respect
to three years before (since the performance variables are measured in logarithms, their dierence is a growth
6See Appendix 9.1 for a detailed description of the rm-level variables employed in our analysis.
7Actually, among the rms who undergo multiple foreign ownership changes, there are only start-stop rms. No rm with a
stop-start pattern is present.
8The trimming procedure that we adopt is explained in Appendix 9.1.
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rate).9 The capital stock shrinks by 24%, while TFP goes down by 37%.10 In the case of a start event, the only
measure which seems not to be negatively aected by the change in ownership is rm size, proxied by the total
number of workers. Turning to the stop events, they show the same negative pattern, although the decrease is
smaller in magnitude.
In the last two columns we report descriptive statistics for the rms which are always domestic or foreign
owned over the entire period. The table conrms the well known result that rms involved in some way in
operations with a foreigner (i.e., starters, stoppers, or always foreign) outperform their domestic counterparts
in terms of size and productivity. The comparison of the performance of rms changing ownership status
(either due to a start or to a stop event) with rms which do not change status (always domestic or always
foreign) unveils interesting results. Firms which start being foreign owned are characterized by an extremely
high level of productivity (either in terms of value added per worker or in terms of TFP) before the start event
takes place. This means that the target of foreign acquisitions are rms being highly ecient. This result
is not new in the literature and goes under the heading of operational eciency theory or \cherry picking"
(see Harris & Robinson, 2002; Balsvik & Haller, 2010, and references therein). Also not new is the fact that,
even if foreigners buy \better" rms, there may be problems of governance and assimilation which induce the
post-acquisition performance of starting rms to be poor. In the immediate post-acquisition period, rms in
our sample experience a decline in productivity of roughly 40%.11
The last piece of evidence that we provide concerns the geographic distribution of the events related to
foreign ownership status. In panel (a) of Figure 2 we plot the total number of start events by province over the
9-year period. In panel (b) we plot the total number of stop events. It is apparent that foreign acquisitions
and foreign divestments are concentrated in the Northern part of the country. We discuss below what are the
implications of this pattern for our analysis.
9Remember that information about ownership is provided for the last year of each wave. Let us consider an example to clarify
the data structure and show some limitations associated to it. If a rm is classied as foreign owned in 2000, but was not so in
1997, we call this a start event. We do not know whether the actual ownership change took place in 1998, 1999 or 2000. However,
since we compute the variation in performance between 1997 and 2000, we are sure that the initial year of the performance measure
(1997) is a point in time before the change in ownership, and the nal year of the performance measure (2000) is either a point
in time after the change (if the change happened in 1998 or 1999) or at most contemporaneous to it (if the change happened in
2000). This implies that we are relating variations in performance over a three-year interval to events of foreign ownership whose
duration is indeed random (two, one or even zero years). This is a source of measurement error. In an ideal setting we would like
to relate the 1997-2000 variation in performance to an event of foreign ownership of xed length, or, alternatively, we would like to
know exactly when the change in foreign ownership occurred in order to normalize variables accordingly.
10We will explain how we measure TFP below.
11The magnitude of the decline is so severe that other factors could be at work, beside governance and assimilation costs narrowly
dened. For example, if some machinery is replaced after the foreign acquisition, in the context of the aliate restructuring, this
will provoke a halt of production, and a decrease in output and measured productivity. Unfortunately, it is very hard to take into
account factors like this in our analysis, due to the lack of appropriate data.
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3.2 Measurement of civic capital and of other explanatory variables
As mentioned earlier, we measure the stock of civic capital in a given province by average electoral turnout in
referenda held between 1946 and 1987, the number of blood donations (per 1000 inhabitants), and the number
of volunteers in non prot organizations (per 100,000 inhabitants). The choice of the proxies for civic capital
is governed by the following reasoning. First, all activities are associated with a personal cost which often
exceeds the mere opportunity cost of time devoted to these activities.12 Second, there are neither nancial nor
legal incentives to pursue these activities. Hence, the reason why individuals vote, donate blood or engage in
volunteering is that they have internalized some common social norm for which they are disposed to incur costs
in view of the fullment of a socially valuable interest, without receiving any material compensation. In section
2 we outlined that the stock of civic capital consists exactly of these behavioral traits.
As each of our proxies of civic capital is supposed to be measured with error, we also extract the rst
principal component out of the three direct measures.13 In this manner we get a regressor capturing the
common component of the three proxies, net of the idiosyncratic factors which induce a certain participation
pattern in some variables and not in others. The following table shows the correlation coecient between the
proxies and the resulting rst principal component.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
As expected, we have a strong positive relationship between each of our three proxies. However, the fact
that the correlation is far from being perfect implies that the proxies are blurred by idiosyncratic factors. The
relationship between the rst principal component and each of the three proxies is roughly equally strong, which
means that there is a strong common pattern. Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the geographic distribution of electoral
turnout, blood donation, and volunteering, respectively. All three maps reveal that civic capital is higher in the
Central and Northern part of the country. Figure 6 shows the geographic distribution across Italian provinces
of the measure of civic capital based on the rst principal component. As before, we nd that civic capital
is the highest in regions in the Center-North, like Emilia-Romagna, and the lowest in the Southern mainland
and Sicily. In the analysis we make use of an historical instrument for current civic capital in the context of
an instrumental variable regression. We pick the average length of communal independence during the Middle
Age of cities belonging to a given province. Putnam et al. (1993) argue that an important role in explaining the
huge dierences in the endowment of civic capital across Italian regions is played by free-city states experience
in the Center-North of the country hundreds of years ago. We further justify the choice of this variable below.
[Insert Figures 3, 4, 5, 6 about here]
The comparison of Figure 2 and Figure 6 unveils the strong spatial correlation between the events related to
changes in foreign ownership and civic capital; that is, the provinces with a higher stock of civic capital are also
12For example, donating blood imposes some physical limitation for few hours after the donation, voting requires information
gathering and evaluation of the dierent alternatives.
13In Appendix 9.2 we review how to compute the rst principal component.
12
more likely to host a start or a stop event. If it were possible to argue that changes in foreign ownership are
randomly assigned across rms in the Italian peninsula, the spatial pattern of FDI would not be problematic
for the identication of the eect on productivity. We discuss below why working in rst dierences increases
the plausibility of exogeneity (or randomness) of foreign ownership. Moreover, we will also discuss the direction
of any remaining bias that survives dierencing.
In Table 2 we also show the correlation coecients with provincial controls such as population density,
GDP, corruption, university graduates and the measure of the average length of trials.14 In the baseline
regressions we always include population density, because there could be positive density externalities that
boost rms' productivity (see, for example, Ciccone & Hall, 1996). In particular, denser areas may provide
better infrastructure and gains due to labor pooling. Conversely, the sign of the externality could also be
negative, because population density may also raise congestion, thus lowering productivity. GDP is another
candidate variable to proxy for the intensity of economic activity in the local area, and is included in the
robustness checks. Another determinant of the intensity of the productivity eect of foreign acquisitions could be
corruption, which is known to discourage FDI (Wei, 2000). Actually, foreign rms performance may deteriorate
in areas where corruption is strong. Corruption is measured through a provincial index for Italy, developed
by Golden & Picci (2005), representing the ratio between what public authorities cumulatively have paid for
local public infrastructure and the physical quantities of infrastructure that exist. The higher it is the ratio of
expenditures over existing infrastructure, the larger it is corruption. The variable university graduates controls
for the stock of human capital accumulated at the local level, which may aect the performance of rms in
general, and that of foreign aliates in particular. Finally, the length of trials aims at capturing the eciency
of legal enforcement, which is often blamed to play an adverse eect on the business environment in Italy, see
Istat (2006).
In Table 3 we provide the full set of descriptive statistics for some of the variables employed in the paper,
both rm-level and provincial.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
4 Empirical strategy
In order to identify the impact of civic capital on rm performance according to the changes in rms' ownership,
we fall back on a two-step procedure.15 Our main performance measure is TFP. In the rst step, TFP is
estimated by the semi-parametric approach proposed by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003). The advantage of this
methodology is that it takes the potential endogeneity of the input factors into account. In particular, the
choice of input quantities might be the outcome of rm productivity. More specically, TFP is obtained by
14Appendix 9.1 provides an exact description and the sources used to compute all these variables.
15This strategy is quite common in the literature. See for example Javorcik (2004) in the case of spillovers from FDI or Lopez
(2009) in the case of exporters.
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estimating separate production functions for each 2-digit NACE industry.16 The generic production function
in industry s is
yijst = 
s
1kit + 
s
2skit + 
s
3unskit + !ijst; (1)
where yijst labels the log of value added (revenues minus input expenditures other than labor) of rm i in
province j in industry s at time t. In the case of TFP estimation, we employ yearly observations for nine
distinct points in time, which correspond to the years from 1995 to 2003.17 The logarithm of capital stock and
the logarithm of the number of skilled and unskilled workers of the rm are denominated kit, skit, and unskit,
respectively. The logarithm of TFP is represented by !ijst and is computed for each rm in the industry in each
year. As explained in Foster et al. (2008), we are well aware that our measure of TFP, which is based ultimately
on revenues and some input expenditures, and not on physical output or physical inputs, is genuinely correlated
with technical and organizational eciency, but also reects other idiosyncratic rm-specic factors, such as
the rm's input and output prices.18 For this reason, our TFP is indeed a measure of overall protability,
with pure productivity being one of the components. This fact bears little consequences to the relevance of our
analysis, provided that interpreting our paper as an attempt to discover the sources of foreign rms protability
is equally interesting, even if one cannot attribute revenue productivity entirely to technical and organizational
eciency.
In the second step, we regress the log of TFP on our variables of interest. Our estimation strategy is based
on a rst-dierencing approach. We start from the following linear equation governing log TFP at the rm
level:
!ijst = 0 + 1FOit + 2(FOit  CCj) + 3(FOit  lnPopj) + t + j + s + jt+ st+ i + ijst: (2)
In this case, we employ three points in time, t = f0; 1; 2g, which correspond to the years 1997, 2000, and
2003: it is only for these years (the nal years of each wave) that the complete set of information is available.
In equation (2), foreign ownership of rm i is denominated by FOit, a dummy which equals 1 if rm i is
foreign owned at time t. Civic capital in province j where rm i is located is labeled CCj . In order to capture
the dierential impact of civic capital on rm performance, we add as a regressor the interaction of foreign
ownership and civic capital, FOit CCj . We also add the interaction of foreign ownership with some provincial
covariates. In the baseline equation we use the log of population density in a given province, labeled lnPopj ,
to control for the heterogeneity of the eect of FO in provinces with dierent density of economic activity. In
the robustness checks we use a wider array of provincial characteristics. The parameter 1 tells us what would
be the impact of foreign ownership on productivity in provinces where the level of civic capital and the log
of population density were zero (there are no such provinces in our data set). The key parameter of interest,
2, indicates how foreign ownership aects productivity as civic capital increases. The parameter 3 informs
16In order to increase precision we use the entire sample for TFP estimation and not just those rms which are sampled for at
least two consecutive waves.
17Because the UniCredit Survey is rotating, not all rms are observed for the full nine-year period.
18The only two inputs measured in physical units are the number of skilled and unskilled workers.
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us about how foreign ownership aects productivity as population density goes up. Lastly, we introduce the
following array of terms: j and s capture all those time-constant features at the provincial and industry level
which inuence rm-level productivity; t is a time eect on productivity; jt and st are time trends in the
eects at the provincial and industry level; i captures all remaining unobserved productivity heterogeneity at
the rm level; nally, ijst is the residual error term. We assume that the error term follows a AR(1) process,
ijst = ijst 1 + ijst, with  close to one and ijst being a white noise.19 We think that this assumption is
well-suited to capture the behavior of productivity at the rm level, because it assumes strong persistency in
the idiosyncratic factors that inuence TFP.
The FO dummy variable is by no means randomly assigned across rms. We explicitly consider dierent
sources of selection bias. A rst source of selection bias concerns the location decision of foreign rms. An
extensive literature studying the location of foreign ownership has found that FDI is directed into areas with a
favorable business environment (Head et al., 1995; Wei et al., 1999; Basile, 2004; Du et al., 2008). In particular,
foreign investors prefer locations with well-functioning public institutions, access to large markets and good
infrastructure. These features may in turn have an impact on rm productivity. In our specication, these
factors are captured by j , a term which controls for province xed eects, and jt, a province-specic time
trend. These characteristics of the rms' business environment, which inuence simultaneously rm performance
and attract foreign direct investment, may bias our OLS estimates if they are not removed from the error term,
because they can induce correlation between the error term and foreign ownership.
A second source of bias is at the rm level. Several studies have proved that foreign investors acquire those
domestic rms which display an above-average productivity level (see, for example, Harris & Robinson, 2002;
Salis, 2008). Table 1 shows that this pattern holds true also in our sample. Moreover, the table shows that rms
receiving FDI are signicantly larger in terms of capital stock and number of employees. This superiority may
descend from rm characteristics such as managerial skills, sophisticated technologies, or brand names which
are typically non-observable. All these features are captured by the rm-specic eect, i. Again, if during the
estimation procedure this term is not removed and goes into the error term, the OLS estimates will be biased.
In order to overcome the potential endogeneity of FO descending from the above mentioned sources, we take
equation (2) in rst dierences. Hence, all time constant eects at the rm level are wiped out. The change in
log TFP can then be expressed as
!ijst = 0 + 1FOit + 2FOit  CCj + 3FOit  lnPopj + t + j + s +ijst; (3)
where the term t = t   t 1 is a new set of time eects, while j and s are province and industry-specic
eects, respectively, and derive from the time trends of equation (2).20 Equation (3) is estimated through OLS
for two time periods, t = f1; 2g, one corresponding to the productivity change between 1997 and 2000, the
other corresponding to the change between 2000 and 2003. Conditional on our set of regressors, we assume
that the correlation between the change in foreign ownership status, FOit, and the error term ijst is zero.
19AR(1) error terms in the equation for productivity have been employed in this context from Grith (1999) onward.
20Adding an intercept 0 or not to our equation in rst dierence is immaterial for the estimation. The only thing to change is
the interpretation of the time eects. We keep the common intercept 0 in all the specications.
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This assumption is satised under strict exogeneity; that is, E(ijst j FOi; i) = 0, where FOi is the vector
of FOit for all t's.
21 In this case the OLS applied to (3) are consistent. The fact that ijst follows an AR(1)
process with  close to one guarantees that ijst is approximately a white noise, and estimation by rst
dierencing is ecient. However, correlation of errors within the same province may descend from the fact that
some key regressors (such as civic capital) are constant at the provincial level (Moulton, 1990). For this reason
we cluster standard errors at the provincial level.22 For each time period, the reference group in equation (3)
consists of rms which do not change their ownership status; that is, those rms such that FOit = 0, either
domestic or foreign owned. Notice that from the estimation of the model in rst dierences of equation (3)
we retrieve the estimates of 1, 2, and 3 from equation (2), which are the parameters that link the level
of a rm productivity, !ijst, to the foreign ownership dummy, FOit. In other terms, while the econometric
model is based on the productivity change of rms which switch ownership status (from domestic to foreign,
and viceversa) having as a reference those who do not change ownership, the estimates can also be interpreted
in terms of the relationship between the level of productivity and foreign ownership. This explains why in the
paper we talk interchangeably of the eect of foreign ownership on performance and of the eect of the change
in foreign ownership on performance.
In the context of our study it may be instructive to dierentiate according to the type of ownership change
that a rm undergoes. We have argued that post-acquisition governance problems are particularly strong in
the case of a foreign investor. On the contrary, when the change in ownership is brought about by a domestic
investor, the post-acquisition performance can be thought to be less aected by the change. For these reasons,
we expect the variation in performance after a start event (when a foreign investor comes in) to be worse than
the variation after a stop event (when a domestic owner replaces a foreign one). This conjecture is conrmed by
the descriptive evidence of Table 1, where the short-run decline in productivity (either in terms of value added
per worker or TFP) is larger in the case of a start event than in the case of a stop event. To check this more
precisely in the framework of our econometric model, for each start event at the rm level we create a dummy
variable START which equals one whenever FO = +1, and for each stop event we create a dummy variable
STOP which equals one in the case that FO =  1. We end up with the following model:
!ijst = 0 + 1STARTit + 2STARTit  CCj + 3STOPit + 4STOPit  CCj
+ 5STARTit  lnPopj + 6STOPit  lnPopj + t + j + s +ijst:
(4)
21When foreign acquisitions (FOit = 1) follow positive shocks to the error term (ijst 1 > 0) the assumption fails. Wooldridge
(2002) p. 285 suggests a simple regression to test whether this is the case or not. In our context this amounts to estimating the
following equation:
!ijst = b0 + a1FOit + a2FOit + t + j + s + eijst:
If a2 is not statistically dierent from zero we can be condent that foreign acquisitions are uncorrelated to past realizations of the
error term ijst, and this is actually what we get (the regression estimates can be found in the online supplementary material).
22A second type of correlation may occur within rms because, for the pairs of observations of rms sampled in both periods, we
may face serial correlation. In other words, conditional on explanatory variables, the covariance of the error term for these rms
across the two time periods is dierent from zero. This may arise if the parameter  in the AR(1) process of ijst is well below one.
Because the pairs of rm observations are nested within provinces, clustering based on the province will also resolve this issue. See
on this Cameron & Miller (2010).
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As before, for each time period, the baseline group consists of rms which do not change ownership status.
The model in equation (3) is nested in the model of equation (4). The former is obtained from the latter if the
following linear restrictions are imposed: 1 =  3, 2 =  4, and 5 =  6.
5 Results
5.1 A simple graph
In this subsection we provide some preliminary evidence through simple graphs on the relationship between
civic capital and the dierences in pre and post-acquisition productivity.
Figure 7 is a box plot which shows the shifts in the distribution of TFP in the time period immediately
before (light gray box) and immediately after (dark gray box) the ownership change takes place, considering the
transition into and out of foreign ownership separately.23 In order to highlight the importance of civic capital,
we have split the sample into high and low civic capital provinces, according to whether the stock of civic capital
in a province is above or below the median value of its distribution. Coherently with the descriptive evidence of
Table 1, we nd that both a start and a stop event is associated with a short-run decrease in rm performance.24
Again, the decline in performance is larger for starters than for stoppers for each subset of provinces (high civic
capital and low civic capital). This comes as no surprise, given that after a start event owners have to operate
the rm in a new business environment, something which is associated with large assimilation and governance
costs. In the case of a stop event, the domestic investor replacing the foreign one seems less aected, arguably
because he is more experienced in running an Italian business rm, and this decreases the post-acquisition
diculties.
Comparing the decline in performance across the two subsets of provinces, we nd that it is more pronounced
in provinces where civic capital is low. This pattern is particularly evident for start events. In terms of median
values, in high civic capital provinces the decline in TFP is equal to -0.09 under a start event, and -0.03 for a
stop event. The corresponding values in low civic capital areas are -0.48 (start), and -0.33 (stop). This is in
line with what we expected, given that the cooperation-enhancing eect of civic capital helps foreign investors
in the aftermath of a start event to overcome the diculties associated with the change in ownership.
23The following example claries the procedure. Consider a rm which is acquired by a foreign investor during the 1997-2000
period. This means that the rm is reported to be domestic in 1997 and foreign in 2000. Then, we consider the year 1997 to be
the time period immediately before the acquisition, and 2000 to be the time period immediately after it.
24The plots are read in the following way. The rectangular box depicts the interquartile range of the distribution, with the
horizontal line within the box being the median. The end of the upper (lower) whisker is the highest (lowest) adjacent value, which
is the highest (lowest) value that can be found after adding (subtracting) to the third (rst) quartile the product of 1.5 times the
interquartile range. Dots beyond the adjacent values depict outliers; that is, values farther away than 1.5 times the interquartile
range. In some cases the whisker cannot be visually identied, because there are few values which are very close one to the other.
We exclude from the plot observations from rms which experience both a start and a stop event over the three-wave period. In this
case there are several ways of assigning observations to the before/after start/stop categories, and hence there are several possible
plots. However, the basic insights of the gure stay the same irrespectively of the specic assignment of these observations.
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[Insert Figure 7 about here]
5.2 Baseline regression results
To begin with, we do a simple regression where the growth rate of productivity is regressed on the foreign
ownership status change plus a set of year, province, and industry xed eects. The dierence with respect to
the model of equation (3) is that in this rst regression we omit the interaction terms. This exercise aims at
assessing the average impact of the foreign ownership change, irrespectively of the degree of civic capital and of
other covariates of the province where the rm is located. The estimates are presented in column (1) of Table
4.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
A negative point estimate implies that rms which become foreign owned (FO = +1) perform on average
worse than rms which do not change ownership status. This may signal an adverse eect of foreign acquisitions
on performance, but the evidence is inconclusive due to the high standard errors involved. This is perfectly
in line with the paper by Benfratello & Sembenelli (2006), where they get a negative point estimate for the
eect of foreign ownership on productivity, although the parameter is not statistically dierent from zero in
most of the specications. Also Harris & Robinson (2002)'s ndings, although rather mixed, point to the
fact that plants acquired by foreign investors may experience lower productivity after the acquisition.25 Finally,
Balsvik & Haller (2010), under several specications and samples, nd that plants subject to foreign acquisitions
do not have TFP levels that dier signicantly from those of their reference group, which contains domestic
plants not belonging to MNEs. Summing up, the estimates show that the average eect on TFP of foreign
ownership in the short run is not statistically dierent from zero. The contribution of our paper to the literature
consists in providing estimates for the eect of foreign ownership based on a geographical stratication. We
believe that estimates of the average eect across local areas, like in column (1) of Table 4, hide substantial
geographic heterogeneity. For this reason, we single out the role of local informal norms and institutions (i.e.,
civic capital) in shaping the performance of foreign rms.
We now present the results from our fully edged model. We experiment with dierent measures of civic
capital. In column (2), civic capital is proxied by the log of electoral turnout in referenda, in column (3) the log
of the number of blood donations is used, whereas in column (4) the log of volunteers is employed. Column (5)
displays the regression when civic capital is measured by the rst principal component of the three variables. In
all these columns, the log of provincial population density, interacted with the change in the foreign ownership
dummy (FO), controls for density externalities aecting the productivity growth of foreign rms.
In each specication with the civic capital interaction, the coecient 1 on the variable of the change in the
foreign ownership status is negative and signicant. This means that in the (hypothetical) province in which
both the log of population density and civic capital are zero, rms which become foreign owned (FO = +1)
25In their paper, the point estimates of the post-acquisition dummies are negative in four out of six years considered in the
analysis. However, out of these four negative dummies, only three of them are statistically dierent from zero.
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perform on average worse than rms which do not experience a change in ownership (the control group). In this
type of province there is evidence of a strong but adverse eect of foreign ownership on productivity. On the
other hand, the positive and signicant interaction coecient of foreign ownership and civic capital (2) implies
that the eect of foreign ownership on productivity is not homogeneous across provinces. The positive estimate
for 2 means that the post-acquisition decrease in TFP is less pronounced where the stock of civic capital
is higher. In the conceptual framework we have explained this phenomenon on the basis of the hampering of
narrow-minded self-interested behavior which typically plagues intra-rm transactions. Provinces endowed with
a high stock of civic capital provide an environment where governance and assimilation costs faced by foreign
investors are reduced. This result holds for each proxy of civic capital and is statistically very signicant.26
We also get a highly signicant coecient for the interaction of FO and the log of population density. This
means that the productivity growth dierential of foreign rms with respect to rms not changing ownership
status is larger in more densely populated areas. Foreign rms benet more from denser areas than rms not
changing ownership. Several factors can explain this result, and pinning down exactly the sources of these
externalities is beyond the scope of our paper. The broad picture seems to be that foreign rms rely more
on good infrastructure and specialized workforce, hence they benet from being in denser areas, where these
factors are abundant. The costs of congestion due to a higher population density are more than oset by the
benets. All in all, it is reassuring that the eect of civic capital survives the inclusion of the interaction of
FO with population density, since it signals that we are not capturing a spurious correlation.
In column (6) and (7) we introduce separately the interaction of FO with civic capital and population
density. Column (6) shows that, without controlling for density, the coecient on the interaction with civic
capital is not statistically dierent from zero a the 10% level (the p-value is equal to 0.16). A reason is the
increase in the standard error of the estimate, from 0.029 in column (5) to 0.038 in column (6). Column
(7) shows that the interaction of the change in ownership with population density taken on its own remains
statistically signicant.
5.3 Estimating separate coecients for start and stop events
We now turn to the estimation of equation (4), where we allow the eect of ownership changes to dier between
the start and the stop events. As before, we rst estimate the simplied version of our model, where all
interaction terms are dropped. The point estimates in column (1) of Table 5 indicate that, immediately after a
start event, rms experience a lower TFP, while a stop event is associated with an increase in TFP, compared to
the case where no ownership change occurs.27 Evidence is quite weak, because coecients are not statistically
26In order to exactly quantify the eect of foreign ownership at dierent points of the distribution of civic capital we should
perform F-tests on linear restrictions involving 1 and 2. To save on space, we do this exercise only for the model where the eect
of start and stop events is estimated separately (see below).
27The positive point estimates for the productivity eect of a stop event is not in accordance with the descriptive evidence of
Table 1 and Figure 7: once we control for a series of industry, province, and time eects, the stop event seems to foster productivity
growth, rather than to halt it. This positive estimate is coherent with the specication of equation (3), where we assume that the
eect of a start event (FO = +1) is the opposite of that of a stop event (FO =  1). See also footnote 29 on this issue.
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dierent from zero.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Each column from (2) to (5) in Table 5 corresponds to an interaction with a dierent civic capital variable.
Consider rst the case of the switch into foreign ownership (START ). The estimate for 1 is negative. Hence,
a switch into foreign ownership brings productivity down if civic capital and population density are zero. The
positive coecient of the interaction term 2 implies that the eect on productivity is higher for rms that
are located in provinces where civic capital is higher. Only when civic capital is measured by volunteering this
eect is not signicant.
In order to quantify more precisely the eect of a start event on TFP growth, we evaluate its marginal
eect at dierent points of the distribution of civic capital. We consider the rst quartile, the median and the
largest value of the distribution of civic capital in provinces that host at least one start event over the 9-year
period of observation.28 Unless otherwise stated, the log of provincial population density is always xed at the
sample mean (equal to 5.144). If the switch into foreign ownership takes place in a province such as Rome, with
an endowment of civic capital in terms of the principal component of -.374 (rst quartile of the distribution
of provinces with some start event), the marginal eect of the ownership change is negative, reaching -.138.
To see whether this value is statistically dierent from zero, we perform an F -test on the linear restriction
(1 + 2   :374 + 5  5:144) = 0 and nd that we can reject the null hypothesis that the linear restriction
equals zero at the 5% level (p-value equal to 0.027); that is, the decrease in productivity growth associated with
a start event is statistically dierent from zero at the 5% level. If we plug in the linear restriction the true value
of the population density of Rome we get a marginal eect equal to -.030, which is not statistically dierent
from zero at the 10% level. Hence, we can conclude that if Rome had not been such a densely populated area
and had had just the median value of population density, the post-acquisition performance of foreign rms
would have been undoubtedly negative due to the relatively low stock of civic capital.
Let us now consider the impact on productivity of an ownership change in the median province in terms
of civic capital among those with some start event (the province is Prato, with a value of CC equal to .872).
In this case, evaluating the marginal eect at the mean level of population density, we get a value of -.047.
The F -test reveals that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the linear restriction is zero at the 10% level.
For the province with the highest level of civic capital (Forl-Cesena, with a value of 2.207) we nd a positive
point estimate of the marginal eect of civic capital equal to .050, being not statistically dierent from zero.
Overall, our ndings conrm the following facts. Apart from provinces with a very high level of civic capital,
the point estimate of the total eect of foreign ownership on productivity is negative (with population density
xed at the median level). This negative sign is statistically dierent from zero at the 5% level in the case of
provinces with a relatively low level of civic capital. The main contribution of our paper is to show that a key
determinant of foreign rms productivity is the degree of opportunism characterizing the area where the rm
is located. Where civic capital is high, the growth rate of TFP of rms that switch into foreign ownership is
28In this manner we are assessing the impact of a start event in provinces that really experienced a foreign acquisition.
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not statistically dierent from the one of rms which do not display any change in ownership. According to our
conceptual framework, in this kind of provinces advantages and disadvantages of foreign ownership compensate
each other so that the net eect on productivity is not signicantly dierent from zero. Where civic capital is
low, in turn, disadvantages due to governance costs are prominent and the performance of rms acquired by
foreign investors is signicantly lower than that of constant ownership rms.
The pattern we have just described is reversed when we consider the switch from foreign into domestic
ownership (stop event). In this case the coecient 3 (measuring the impact of the stop dummy when civic
capital and log population density are zero) is positive, while 4 (the coecient of the interaction term with
civic capital) is negative, although the last term is never statistically dierent from zero.29
Regarding population density, the change to foreign ownership (start event) enhances productivity more
in densely populated areas than in sparsely populated areas. The change to domestic ownership (stop event)
exhibits the opposite pattern, since rm productivity benets more where population is scattered around.
Again, the picture is consistent with a situation where foreign rms rely more on factors available in dense areas
(e.g., infrastructure, specialized workforce). Domestic businesses can be thought to be more sensitive to the
congestion costs of densely populated areas, and for this reason their productivity improves as density shrinks.
6 Discussion, robustness, and extensions of the analysis
We now further discuss the problem of endogeneity and what is the impact on the estimation results. Then, we
provide some robustness checks to our analysis.
6.1 Further endogeneity concerns
An issue that is worth taking into account is the fact that foreign rms' acquisitions can be concentrated in
some selected areas. If rms of the same type (in terms of some unobserved characteristic) tend to locate in
the same areas this could induce a bias in our estimation. To clarify the issue, we consider the following case
which may arise in our context.
Let us assume that foreign investors take the future governance and assimilation costs induced by the
ownership change into account when deciding where to invest. Given that civic capital decreases governance
costs, we may have a non-random selection which introduces an endogeneity bias in our analysis. In particular,
foreign investors who expect for some reason their rms to perform poorly after the acquisition may seek to
go in areas where civic capital is higher, to reduce at least the impact of governance costs. On the contrary,
foreign investors with an idiosyncratically low tendency to post-acquisition problems may care less about the
civic capital of the province where they are investing, and so have a relatively higher chance of landing up
29The fact that the sign of the estimates of 3 and 4 is the opposite of that of 1 and 2 is reassuring, provided that the model
in equation (3) is obtained from the model in equation (4) if the following linear restrictions are imposed: 1 =  3, 2 =  4, and
5 =  6. If we test these linear restrictions after having estimated equation (4), they are not rejected by an F -test at the 10%
level of statistical signicance.
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in areas with low civic capital. We take comfort from the fact that this kind of self-selection tends to bias
our estimates downwards. Since we nd that foreign rms in high civic capital areas tend to perform better
than foreign rms in low civic capital areas, the fact that \bad" foreign investors (in terms of post-acquisition
performance) are going in high civic capital areas would cause an underestimation of the true positive eect of
civic capital on the performance dierential.
Another source of endogeneity may descend from the following fact. While the specication in rst dierences
eliminates all sort of unobservables at the rm level that are time constant, we cannot exclude that foreign
investment is based on a certain growth pattern at the individual level. For example, it could be the case
that start events are more frequent in rms experiencing a high growth rate of the capital stock (thanks to
high investment) or size, and that these factors have an impact on subsequent productivity. In the robustness
analysis we deal with this issue.
Finally, consider the following problem. Since we expect property right protection to be good and contractual
incompleteness to be low where civic capital is high, it is more likely that MNEs will opt for arms length
transactions with rms in these provinces, instead of vertical FDI. By the same token, vertical FDI should
be more likely in low civic capital provinces. This could induce empirically a negative correlation between the
occurrence of foreign acquisitions of the vertical type and civic capital, leading to a selection bias if rms that are
target of vertical FDI (and that for this reason are clustered in low civic capital provinces) are idiosyncratically
dierent in terms of productivity dynamics with respect to other rms. It is dicult to give a precise sign to
this potential bias, because it is not clear a priori whether vertical FDI rms perform inherently \better" or
\worse" in terms of TFP. Together with the fact that in the case of horizontal FDI there is not an obvious
correlation between civicness in the local area and the occurrence of foreign acquisitions, this makes us condent
that results are not substantially aected.
6.2 Robustness to other denitions of foreign ownership
We now check whether the results are robust to dierent denitions of foreign ownership. The rst change
consists of considering a rm as foreign owned when at least 30% of the equities are held by a foreign person.
The second change is to consider as a threshold the 50% share. The idea is to focus only on switches in ownership
that are associated with a relevant modication of property rights, since these are the events which are most
likely associated with a substantial change in the governance of the rm. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show
that the results are robust to the change in the threshold for foreign ownership.
In column (3) we introduce a continuous variable of the change in foreign ownership status. To do so,
instead of employing a dummy variable equal to one when the share held by a foreign person is above a certain
threshold and zero otherwise, we use the total share held by foreigners. This implies that in the specication in
rst dierences we employ the change in the total share held by foreigners (a continuous measure) to proxy the
risk of experiencing governance and assimilation costs. The results show that the interaction of the change in
foreigners' share and civic capital is positive and statistically dierent from zero. The economic interpretation
is slightly dierent in this case, and provides a deeper result than the one obtained in the baseline analysis,
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because we can conclude that also the intensity of the ownership change matters, with rms subject to a larger
acquisition being more sensitive to civic capital than rms subject to a smaller acquisition. This is coherent with
our conceptual framework, because larger changes in ownership are more likely to foster larger reorganizations
which in turn increase the incidence of governance and assimilation costs on productivity.
In column (4) we introduce two separate continuous variables: Increase foreign share is the absolute value
of the increase in the foreign share; Decrease foreign share is the absolute value of the decrease. Results are
consistent with our previous ndings.
6.3 Other robustness and sensitivity checks
In Table 7 we perform some other robustness checks. In column (1) we test the robustness of the interaction
term between foreign ownership and civic capital to the inclusion of an interaction between foreign ownership
and a measure of corruption at the provincial level. Table 2 shows that, from an empirical point of view, civic
capital is highly correlated with corruption, because provinces with more civicness are also those that turn out
to be the least corrupted according to the Golden-Picci index. Indeed, it is possible to argue that corruption is
endogenous to civic capital. This notwithstanding, we think that it is instructive to show what happens when
we have both variables in the same equation, because they capture features of the local business environment
that are conceptually distinct. By now it should be clear that civic capital is a way to evaluate accurately the
incidence of opportunistic behavior in intra-rm relationships. Instead, the attitude toward corruption reveals
the extent to which public authorities misuse their power, and this aects the relationship between the rm and
public authorities more than intra-rm interactions. Moreover, in the Golden-Picci index outright fraud and
illegal monetary transactions regarding public infrastructure spending are indistinguishable from pure waste,
ineciency, and mismanagement. In other terms, the corruption index is also a measure of the eciency of local
public institutions. Estimates show that, even after controlling for corruption, civic capital remains statistically
signicant at the 10% level. The intensity of corruption in the local area seems to play no role. This may be
the case if corruption or, more generally, ineciency of local public authorities harm domestic and foreign rms
equally.
In column (2) we measure the size of the local market by provincial gross domestic product instead of
population density.30 There is a decrease in magnitude but the coecient is still statistically dierent from
zero. We prefer including population density in the baseline specication instead of GDP as a control. The
reason is that we think that provincial GDP is more likely to be an outcome of civic capital than population
density. In this sense, following Angrist & Pischke (2009), it is a \bad control" provided that its inclusion may
induce a selection bias.31 A source of bias is the following. When controlling for GDP, the estimation of the
30We average gross domestic product for each province over the period 1995-2003.
31Algan & Cahuc (2010) and Tabellini (2010) show that civic capital boosts GDP growth. Also population density may be
related to the stock of civic capital, if we assume some mechanism under which intense social interaction (due to high population
density) facilitates the development of civic virtues. However, the fundamental dierence is that while GDP is more likely to be
an outcome of civic capital, population density is more likely to be predetermined with respect to it. And it is preferable to have
controls that are not outcomes themselves of the regressor of interest (see again Angrist & Pischke, 2009).
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coecient on civic capital comes out from a comparison of foreign rms in provinces with a high GDP and a
low level of civic capital with foreign rms in provinces with both high GDP and high civic capital. The former
rms (in the high GDP and low civic capital area) benet probably from some unobserved features that improve
TFP dynamics, which are the same factors explaining why, notwithstanding a low civic capital, the area scores
a high GDP. If this is true, we expect a downward bias for the interaction term of FO and civic capital, and
this is what we get from our estimates.
In column (3) we control for a wider array of provincial controls. In addition to the interaction with popula-
tion density, we introduce the interaction of FO with the logarithm of the share of university graduates at the
provincial level, and with the logarithm of the length of trials in civil aairs. The results show that the inter-
actions with the controls are not statistically dierent from zero. The point estimate of 2 is somehow aected
(the coecient is now signicant at the 10% level only). We explain this fact with the sizeable multicollinearity
among the provincial regressors, which inates their standard errors, and with the endogeneity of a regressor
such as the length of trials, which bias downward the estimate of 2.
32 The large change in the coecient of the
main term, corresponding to 1 in equation (3), is not due to misspecication but it reects that the coecient
has to be interpreted dierently, since it represents the marginal eect of the change in foreign ownership when
all the other covariates (civic capital, and the logarithms of population density, university graduates and length
of trials) are zero.
In column (4) we include rm-level controls into the productivity regression, such as the one-period lag of
the growth rate of size (in terms of workers), of the capital stock, and of the number of skilled workers. The
inclusion of lagged growth rates of rm-level variables tries to reduce rm-specic unobserved heterogeneity
upon which foreign acquisitions can be based. As an example, we mentioned above the case where start events
could be more frequent in rms experiencing a high investment rate (and a high growth of the capital stock). If
investment has an eect on productivity growth in the next period, its omission may induce a bias. We present
results where we introduce an array of rm-level controls plus their interaction with civic capital. The estimates
show a limited sensitivity to the addition of these variables.
Next, in column (5) we exclude observations located in Milan, the province with the largest number of
changes in foreign ownership. Results reveal that they are not driven by this province.
In column (6) we reduce the sample to include only provinces with at least two start events and two stop
events. Since in many provinces there is only one change in foreign ownership (be it start or stop), the idea is
to show that our results are not driven by them. We end up including the following local areas: Turin, Milan,
Bergamo, Verona, Modena and Naples. The point estimate of the coecient on the interaction between civic
32Despite the same legal origin and identical formal laws in each province, stark dierences exist in the eectiveness of law
enforcement (proxied by the length of trials) across Italy. An explanation could run as follows. Where civic capital is low
opportunistic behavior is widespread, so that people tend to sue more frequently others. This creates congestion in the judicial
system in areas with low civic capital. Correlation coecients of Table 2 between civic capital and length of trials conrm this.
In the case of Mexico, Laeven & Woodru (2007) attribute the geographic dierential in the eectiveness of legal enforcement
(measured with an index based on interviews with 519 lawyers) to the prevalence of indigenous population one hundred years ago,
or to the production of agricultural crops with high economies of scale in 1939.
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capital and the change in foreign ownership is still statistically signicant. However, the magnitude is reduced.
In column (7) we exclude from the sample rms that are always foreign over the three waves. Results do
not change.
6.4 Other rm-level outcomes as dependent variable
The main objective of this paper is to analyze whether the eect of foreign ownership on productivity depends
on the stock of civic capital of the local area where the rm is located. At the same time, there could be
other rm-level outcomes that are aected in a similar way. In section 2.2.3 we discussed why civic capital
could impact on the adoption of rm-level managerial-organizational innovations that are expected to follow
a foreign acquisition. The UniCredit Survey allows us to look into this, since there is a question about the
adoption of managerial-organizational innovations during the three-year period covered by a given wave.33 The
survey explicitly relates managerial-organizational innovations to other two types of innovations: product and
process innovations. Firms are asked whether they performed managerial-organizational innovations linked to
product or process innovations. Regrettably, in this way the question is narrowing the scope of these managerial-
organizational improvements, and is also introducing a confounding factor (whether the rm performed or not
a product or process innovation). We correct for this issue by estimating a specication where we condition
managerial-organizational innovations linked to product or process innovations to the actual occurrence of a
product or process innovation. Another important issue is to establish the exact timing of managerial innovations
to look at. It is reasonable to believe that improvements to managerial practices take some time to materialize.
We try two dierent exercises. In the rst we look at the one period lead of episodes of managerial innovations,
with respect to the time of the ownership change. For example, if a rm becomes foreign owned during the
9th wave (2001-2003), we consider whether a managerial-organizational innovation is adopted in the 10th wave
(2004-2006). This introduces a more demanding requirement in terms of data availability, because in this kind
of exercise a rm has to be surveyed for at least three consecutive waves (in the example, the rm needs to
be surveyed in the 8th and 9th waves to record the change in foreign ownership, and in the 10th wave to
record the one period lead of the managerial innovation variable). Given the rotating structure of the panel
(in each wave some rms are dropped from the sample and replaced with other new rms) we are left with
fewer observations than in the baseline regressions. The second exercise looks at managerial innovations that
are contemporaneous to the change in foreign ownership. For example, if a rm becomes foreign owned during
the 9th wave (2001-2003), we study whether it reports to have adopted a managerial innovation during the
same period of time. Since estimates from this second exercise are never statistically dierent from zero, we
omit them in what follows to save on space and we concentrate only on the one period lead of the variable of
interest.
In columns from (1) to (4) of Table 8 we present the estimates of a probit model where the dependent variable
is equal to one if the rm adopted a managerial-organizational innovation in the wave subsequent to the one
where the change in ownership happened, and zero otherwise. The managerial-organizational change is linked
33In Appendix 9.1 we describe the question.
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either to process (columns (1) and (2)) or to product innovations (columns (3) and (4)). Estimates are obtained
either conditioning on the presence of a process or product innovation (columns (1) and (3)) or not (columns (2)
and (4)). The introduction of the control for the process/product innovation claries the interpretation of the
eect of foreign ownership. Conditioning on the fact that the rm undertakes a process innovation, we are left
with evidence that foreign rms in a high civic capital area are more prone to implement also a reorganization
related to this innovation, while rms located in a low civic capital area are less prone to it (even when they
innovate the production process). This can be explained by the presence, in areas where civic capital is low, of
obstacles to information and knowledge ows, tasks coordination, and congruence in the agents' objectives, that
are crucial for the eective transmission and implementation of new managerial-organizational practices within
the MNE. The magnitude of the marginal eect of the interaction between the change in foreign ownership
and civic capital on the probability to adopt the managerial improvement in column (1) is equal to 0.176, if we
evaluate all other regressors at their means. The eect is sizeable. The chance that a rm switching into foreign
ownership in Milan (principal component equal to +1.236) adopts a managerial-organizational innovation is 28
percentage points higher than in Rome (principal component equal to -0.374).
Turning to managerial-organizational innovations related to a product innovation, the interaction term
between the change in foreign ownership and civic capital is not statistically signicant, although the coecients
have a positive sign.34 All in all, the evidence concerning the implementation of managerial-organizational
improvements reinforces the broad picture coming out from our analysis. On the one side, in our baseline
estimates we get a more favorable dynamics in terms of TFP for foreign rms located in high civic capital areas.
On the other side we get that, over the time interval corresponding to the wave following the one where the
change in foreign ownership occurs, these rms are more prone to improve their managerial practices. This may
eventually magnify their productivity advantage.
Finally, in column (5) of Table 8 we measure rm performance in terms of labor productivity (value added
per worker). This is a variable closely related to TFP. Results are robust to this change in the measurement of
the dependent variable.
7 Instrumental variable estimates
In Table 9 we present the results of two-stage least squares estimates, obtained employing a historical variable
as instrument. While our econometric specication in equation (3) is appropriate in addressing rm-level
idiosyncracies, it is less eective in solving problems of reversed causation. In particular, OLS estimates assume
that the stock of civic capital is not aected by TFP dynamics. To the extent that the values and beliefs of the
local population that account for civic capital are inuenced by economic development and well-being prompted
34A process innovation diers from a product innovation in terms of reorganization intensity. A larger number of managerial
innovations is at stake in a process innovation, making it easier to identify the impact of civicness. There is evidence that process
innovation is more systemic in nature, as it puts together several actors, while product innovation tends to be more self-contained
(Damanpour & Gopalakrishnan, 2001). Therefore, a process innovation is associated with a potentially larger number of changes
to the organizational and administrative structure and this facilitates identication.
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by rms productivity, we face endogeneity problems due to reversed causality. Similarly, to the extent that there
are other variables not captured by our controls but relevant for the analysis, our estimates might be subject
to an omitted variables bias.
To address these problems we perform a two-stage least squares instrumental variable (IV) regression in
which we instrument provincial civic capital by the average length (in years) of communal independence during
the Middle Age of the cities belonging to the province. We take this information from Guiso et al. (2008a).
The authors collect historical data at the town level for the 400 biggest cities in terms of population in 1871 for
the Center-North of Italy. They conne data collection to this area because free-city states were a peculiarity
of this part of the Italian peninsula. Cities in the South never experienced communal independence due to the
presence of kingdoms of Norman descent.35 We use city-level data to compute a provincial weighted average of
the length of independence: the number of years of independence of individual cities in a province is weighted
by city population in 1871, also provided in Guiso et al. (2008a).
Instrumenting today's stock of civic capital by the length of communal independence entails several advan-
tages. First, we have good reasons to believe that this historical variable has predictive power on the current
stock of civic capital and is therefore a strong instrument. The communal republicanism that emerged from the
12th century in Central and Northern Italy was a kind of self-government based on strong horizontal ties and
civic commitment. Putnam et al. (1993) emphasize that communal independence was crucial for the formation
of civic capital, and it eventually explains the pronounced geographic disparities in current civic capital across
Italy. Testing Putnam's conjecture, Guiso et al. (2008a) empirically show that communal independence of Ital-
ian cities has increased their current stock of civic capital. The strength of the instrument is also predicted
by theoretical models. In fact, several papers stress the persistence of civic capital over long periods of time,
including several centuries, highlighting the crucial role of intergenerational transmission of values and beliefs
from parents to their ospring (Tabellini, 2008; Guiso et al., 2008b). For these reasons, we believe that the
length of communal independence is a strong instrument for today's civic capital.
Second, given the huge time lag of roughly 800 years we are condent that the instrument is truly exogenous
in our context. In particular, we believe that it is exogenous in the rst stage regression. At the same time, the
instrument has to satisfy the exclusion restriction in order to be valid. This requires that, conditional on the
other regressors, the length of communal independence has an eect on TFP dynamics only through the current
stock of civic capital. We acknowledge that this is questionable in some way. In fact, it is not implausible that
communal independence during the Middle Age has spurred TFP growth in foreign rms through channels other
than the formation of civic capital. To some extent, our specication mitigates these threats as it allows for
province xed eects. They absorb any direct eect of the business environment on TFP growth, independently
of ownership status. However, we are aware that this cannot be a denite proof that the exclusion restriction
35There are two facts that make us condent that the sample of 400 cities is representative of the history of the universe of Italian
towns in Center-North. The rst is that, in terms of provincial population in 1871, these 400 towns, on average, make up 45% of
total provincial population, so we are catching the historical details of a large share of population. The second fact is that ignoring
the history of smaller towns (those outside the 400 group) is equivalent to assume that all of them were never free-city states, and
this is not unreasonable.
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is not violated.
Panel B of Table 9 shows the results from the rst stage of IV regressions. The dependent variable (the
potentially endogenous variable) is the interaction of FO and the proxy for civic capital. In columns (1) -
(3) civic capital is measured respectively by turnout in referenda, blood donations, and volunteering, whereas
the principal component is used in columns (4) and (5). In columns (1) - (4) we use fewer controls, while in
column (5) we have the full array of controls. As expected, the length of independence during the Middle Age
has strong predictive power on the current stock of civic capital, even after controlling for the other regressors.
The coecient of the interaction of FO with the log of the years of independence is positive and statistically
signicant in each specication. Partial R2 is large. Moreover, the F -statistics of the excluded instrument are
in general suciently large to conclude that we do not employ a weak instrument, because they are larger or
close to 10.36
Results from the second stage are presented in Panel A of Table 9. As in the case of OLS, the interaction
of FO with civic capital is positive and statistically dierent from zero at conventional levels of signicance.
For each proxy of civic capital, the magnitude of IV estimates is larger than their OLS counterparts. A possible
explanation is that civic capital is still measured with error, even in the case of the rst principal component.
As a result, OLS are downward biased, and the true magnitude of the eect is given by the IV estimates. In the
literature about institutions and development there are notable cases where IV estimates are larger than the
OLS ones. We mention here the papers by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011). Also
these papers plead for the presence of an attenuation bias due to measurement error. As a robustness check,
and to address concerns that our instrument might violate the exclusion restriction, we estimate in column (5)
a more general specication in which additional regressors are included. We include the share of university
graduates, and the length of trials in civil law aairs. The results are robust to this inclusion. The coecient
of interest is still signicant at the 10% level, and it is still larger than the corresponding OLS coecient in
column (3) of Table 7.
To sum up, IV estimation with an historical instrument provides results which are consistent with OLS
ndings. IV point estimates are actually larger than OLS. Then, we are condent that OLS are not plagued by
reversed causality and by omitted variables bias.
8 Conclusion
We showed that the eect of foreign ownership on rm performance depends on the stock of civic capital
of the area where the recipient rm of the FDI is located. Starting from an econometric model where the
productivity of a rm is assumed to depend on the foreign ownership status and civic capital, we turned to
a rst-dierencing approach in order to identify the eect on productivity. We found that civic capital has a
36The standard threshold of 10 for the rejection of the null of a weak instrument is valid under the hypothesis that the error term
ijst is white noise. We are in this case when ijst follows a random walk (shocks to productivity are very persistent, something
that is plausible in our context).
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statistically signicant positive eect on the productivity of foreign rms. When we estimate the eect of start
and stop events separately, in the case of rms that cease to be foreign owned (thus becoming domestic again)
we found an eect which is not statistically dierent from zero. Overall, these results suggest that civic capital
substantially limits assimilation and governance costs of foreign rms. We also found that a change in foreign
ownership status is more likely to lead to innovations in managerial-organizational practices in areas where civic
capital is higher. The estimation took explicitly into account unobserved rm-level heterogeneity, as well as
industry, province, and time trends.
This study provides an important new insight on the eect of foreign ownership on rm performance. Rather
than assuming that assimilation and governance costs of foreign aliates are constant within a country, we stress
the importance of informal norms and institutions at the local level, and in particular we show that the level
of local civic capital exerts an eect on performance. Globalization is steadily increasing the weight of foreign
rms in national economies worldwide. Hence, learning the determinants of the TFP of foreign enterprises is
important since it can inform us on the constraints faced by them in particular environments, and, implicitly,
about the determinants of aggregate productivity.
We believe that future research on the topic should address the following issues. First of all, our analysis
admittedly provides a short run view on the TFP dynamics. We analyze TFP changes and ownership changes
that occur over a period of three years only (the lapse of time between two consecutive waves). We cannot
exclude that the productivity implications of foreign acquisitions may be dierent when aliates are observed
over a longer period of time. Another important issue that deserves more attention in the future is to understand
whether the nationality of the investor plays a role, in conjunction with civic capital, in shaping the performance
of foreign aliates. Results such as those in Benfratello & Sembenelli (2006) highlight that the nationality of the
investor can make a dierence. Unfortunately, the UniCredit data set does not allow to retrive the nationality
of the foreign investor. This would be an interesting piece of information, since one could investigate if and
how the cultural distance between the investing country and Italy interacts with civic capital to inuence the
performance of foreign rms.
9 Appendix
9.1 Detailed description of the data set
9.1.1 Firm-level variables
Value added : Value added, deated by 2-digit NACE producers' price indices obtained from Istat tables. Base
year is 2000. Source: Bureau Van Dijk's AIDA.
Capital stock : Fixed assets, deated through an average of the 2-digit price indices employed for value added.
Base year is 2000. Source: Bureau Van Dijk's AIDA.
Skilled workforce: Skilled workers include entrepreneurs, executives and white collars. Source: UniCredit
Survey.
Unskilled workforce: Unskilled workers include blue collars. Source: UniCredit Survey.
Here we report the question A7 from the UniCredit Survey regarding the ownership structure, and the
question C2.1.1 regarding managerial-organizational innovations.
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A7. State, in a descending order in terms of voting securities owned, the characteristics of persons that own
and/or directly control the enterprise.
Persons Type of person Share of voting Does the person Does the person
(keep anonymous) (see Note) securities held exert a direct control have voting deals
by the person on the rm? with others?
A7.1 Person a 1 2 3 4 5 % 1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No
A7.2 Person b 1 2 3 4 5 % 1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No
A7.3 Person c 1 2 3 4 5 % 1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No
A7.4 Others %
Total 100%
Note: Indicate as follows: 1) Person non resident in Italy; 2) Physical person resident in Italy; 3) Italian business
enterprise operating in manufacturing; 4) Italian business enterprise operating in services; 5) Italian banks and other
Italian nancial institutions.
C2.1.1. During the years [e.g., 2001-2003 for the 9th wave] the rm realized: [Multiple choices allowed]
1. product innovations
2. process innovations
3. managerial-organizational innovations linked to product innovations
4. managerial-organizational innovations linked to process innovations
5. none of them
9.1.2 Trimming procedure
Observations which display an extreme growth rate in value added, capital stock, number of blue collars, or
number of white collars are excluded from the regression. A growth rate is considered as extreme if it belongs
to the upper (99.5%) or lower (0.5%) tail of the distribution of growth rates. Growth rates are calculated for
each couple of subsequent years within the period 1995-2003.
9.1.3 Measures of civic capital
Blood donations: The number of blood donations per 1000 inhabitants, disaggregated by province. The data are
collected from the health authorities of Italian regions. In each region, regional health authorities collect data on
blood donations and subsequently send this information to the Superior Institute of Health (Istituto Superiore
di Sanita) which, in turn, maintains a National and Regional Registry of Blood and Plasma. Provincial data
on blood donations are not available for Apulia and Lazio. For the provinces of these two regions we take the
total regional value. Data refer to the year 2002 and the source is Cartocci (2007) on data from the Superior
Institute of Health.
Volunteers: It is the number of volunteers in non-prot organizations per 100,000 inhabitants. Data refer
to the year 2000 and the source is de Blasio & Nuzzo (2010).
Referenda turnout : It is the average provincial electoral turnout for the referenda on the choice between
republic and monarchy (1946), divorce (1974), public nancing of political parties (1978), public security and
anti-terrorism measures (1981), abortion (1981), wage escalator regulations (1985) and nuclear power and
hunting regulations (1987). The following eight provinces were created after 1995: Biella, Lecco, Lodi, Rimini,
Prato, Crotone, Vibo Valentia, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola. The provinces to which they belonged before 1995
and whose value has been assigned to them appear in parenthesis: Biella (Vercelli), Lecco (simple average of
Bergamo and Como), Lodi (Milan), Rimini (Forl-Cesena), Prato (Firenze), Crotone (Catanzaro), Vibo Valentia
(Catanzaro), Verbano-Cusio-Ossola (Novara). The source of data for referendum turnout is the Ministry of the
Interior.
Average length of communal independence: Starting from the 400 city data set of Guiso et al. (2008a), we
assign each city to a province. We then compute the average length of communal independence at the provincial
level by weighting each city's years of independence during the Middle Age with its population in 1871 (this
information about historical population is also provided in the data set).
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9.1.4 Other provincial covariates
Population density: Total population over total provincial area, expressed in thousands of inhabitants per
squared kilometer, averaged over the period 1995-2003. Source: Istat.
Corruption: We measure corruption through the index proposed by Golden & Picci (2005). The corruption
variable is built as follows. First, the authors consider a measure of physical public infrastructure in each
Italian province with reference to a specic year, 1997. Second, they retrieve the stock of public capital from
a historically cumulative measure of yearly expenditures in infrastructure (from 1954) using the perpetual
inventory method. The authors then take the ratio of the two measures. When a province shows a relatively
low value of physical infrastructure in terms of the \real" 1997 value, but a relatively high infrastructure stock
according to the expenditures ows aggregated by the perpetual inventory method, this can be taken as evidence
of corruption, or, more generally, ineciency and waste in public spending. The authors provide the data in
the Appendix C of their paper.
GDP: Provincial value added expressed in millions of Euro, averaged over the period 1995-2003. Source:
Istat.
Length of trials: It is the number of days it takes to complete a rst degree trial in civil aairs in each of
the 165 Italian labor courts. The data are averaged over the years 1995-2003 and are provided by Istat in the
data base Territorial Information System on Justice (Sistema Informativo Territoriale sulla Giustizia). Since
there are more courts than provinces and since in some cases the territory of a court belongs to two dierent
provinces we proceed as follows. First, we assign to each city of the province the value of the court to which
the city belongs. This information is then averaged for all the cities belonging to the same province to get a
provincial variable.
University graduates: It is the number of university graduates per province, divided by total provincial
population. The data refer to the 2001 Census of the population and are from Istat.
9.2 Derivation of the rst principal component
The intuition of principal component analysis (PCA) in our context is the following: given the three proxies of
civic capital, each province corresponds to a point in a three dimensional vector space. The idea of PCA is to
nd a linear combination of the three variables which re-expresses the original data set in such a way that it
captures most of the common variance. This linear combination corresponds to the rst principal component.
In general terms, the rst principal component can be derived as follows (see Jollie, 2002): vector x
denominates the data consisting of p random variables (the three proxies of civic capital in our case) and vector
1 consists of p constants, 11; 12; : : : 1p. Consider the linear function 
0
1x:
01x = 11x1 + 12x2 + : : :+ 1pxp =
pX
j=1
1jxj (5)
Finding the rst principal component amounts to determine the elements of 1 which maximize the variance
of V ar[01x] = 
0
1S1, where S is the covariance matrix of x. The vector 1 is constrained to have unit length,
which implies that 011 = 1. The corresponding Lagrange maximization function takes the following form:
01S1   (011   1): (6)
Maximizing (6) with respect to 1 gives
(S  Ip)1 = 0; (7)
in which the Lagrange multiplier  is the eigenvalue of S and the corresponding eigenvector is 1. Ip is the
p-dimensional identity matrix. Because the quantity to be maximized is 01S1 = 
0
11 = , the eigenvector
with the highest eigenvalue is chosen. The rst principal component is then 01x. In our data, the highest
eigenvalue takes the value of 2.48. The associated eigenvector explains 75% of the total variance.
9.3 Online supplementary material
Supplementary material with some other regressions is available online.
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Figure 1: Change in foreign ownership and rm performance: The role of civic capital.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Total number of start (panel a) and stop (panel b) events by province.
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Figure 3: Map of electoral turnout in referenda, averaged over 7 referenda that took place between 1946 and
1987.
Figure 4: Map of blood donations per 1000 inhabitants.
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Figure 5: Map of the number of volunteers in non-prot organizations per 100,000 inhabitants.
Figure 6: Map of civic capital measured by the rst principal component of blood donations, volunteering, and
electoral turnout.
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Figure 7: This graph plots the distribution of TFP before (light gray) and after (dark gray) a start or a stop
event, for low civic capital provinces and high civic capital provinces respectively. The dots outside the boxes
are outliers.
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Table 1: Firm performance and ownership structure
START event STOP event Always Always
Before After Variation Before After Variation Domestic Foreign
Capital stock (log) 8.222 7.978 -.243*** 8.002 7.939 -.063 6.981 9.135
Workers (log) 4.136 4.184 .049* 4.252 4.202 -.050 3.596 4.936
Value added per worker (log) 4.302 3.889 -.413*** 4.024 3.860 -.164*** 3.684 3.897
Total Factor Prod. (log) 5.068 4.694 -.374*** 4.795 4.675 -.120** 4.387 4.961
Obs. 73 73 73 40 40 40 1802 16
Note: The table shows the performance of rms according to dierent types of ownership structure. First of all, we report
the mean of some rm-level variables before and after the two events that characterize the change in ownership (starting
to be foreign owned and stopping to be foreign owned). The variation is measured over periods of three years (1997-2000
or 2000-2003). The last two columns summarize data for rms which are always domestic owned and rms which are al-
ways foreign owned over the entire period. The dierent performance measures are: Value added per worker is the log of
deated value added divided by the total number of workers employed by the rm; Capital is equal to deated xed as-
sets; Workers is the total number of employees; Total Factor Productivity is a residual term whose computation follows
Levinsohn & Petrin (2003). ***,**,* denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively, of a paired t-test where
the null is the equality of the mean before and after the relevant event.
Table 2: Correlation among the proxies of civic capital and the other provincial covariates
Turnout Volunteers Blood Princ. comp. Pop. density Corruption GDP Univ. graduates
Volunteers 0.69 1
Blood 0.61 0.57 1
Princ. comp. 0.89 0.87 0.84 1
Pop. density 0.15 -0.01 0.06 0.08 1
Corruption -0.60 -0.47 -0.57 -0.63 0.24 1
GDP 0.28 0.10 0.23 0.24 0.62 -0.05 1
Univ. graduates 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.33 0.03 0.44 1
Length of trials -0.67 -0.54 -0.60 -0.70 -0.13 0.49 -0.27 -0.11
Note: The number of observations is 103. We take the logarithm of all variables. Turnout is the log of the average electoral turnout
in referenda between 1946 and 1987; Volunteers is the log of the number of volunteers in non-prot institutions per 100,000 inhabi-
tants in 2000; Blood is the log of the number of blood donations per 1000 inhabitants inn 2002; Princ. comp. is the the rst principal
component of the above mentioned three proxies of civic capital; Pop. density is the log of provincial population density averaged
over the period 1995-2003; Corruption is the log of the Golden-Picci index of corruption at the provincial level; GDP is the log of
provincial gross domestic product averaged over the period 1995-2003; Univ. graduates is the log of the share of provincial population
holding a university degree in 2001; Length of trials is the provincial log of the number of days needed to complete a rst-degree trial
averaged over the period 1995-2003.
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Table 5: TFP dynamics and ownership change with civic capital interactions: START and STOP
dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No interactions Turnout Blood Volunteers Principal comp.
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
START -0.008 -5.366*** -1.513** -1.180* -0.515**
(0.037) (1.814) (0.625) (0.641) (0.203)
START lnTurnout 1.123***
(0.399)
START lnBlood 0.281*
(0.150)
START lnV olunteers 0.086
(0.069)
START lnPrincipal comp. 0.072**
(0.031)
STOP 0.063 3.990 1.442 2.190 0.738**
(0.058) (3.363) (0.914) (1.441) (0.349)
STOP lnTurnout -0.759
(0.729)
STOP lnBlood -0.212
(0.196)
STOP lnV olunteers -0.176
(0.146)
STOP lnPrincipal comp. -0.073
(0.064)
START lnPopulation density 0.067** 0.078*** 0.072** 0.079**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
STOP lnPopulation density -0.099** -0.102** -0.103* -0.109**
(0.048) (0.048) (0.054) (0.055)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.352 0.356 0.355 0.355 0.356
Obs. 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954
Note: The table presents the results of OLS estimates. Fixed eects for each 2-digit industry, each province, and
each time period are included. The dependent variable is the change in log TFP, !ijst. START is a dummy
variable which equals one if a rm becomes foreign owned. STOP is a dummy variable which equals one if a rm
becomes domestic owned. We use the following variables to measure civic capital: ln Turnout is the log of the aver-
age electoral turnout in referenda between 1946 and 1987; ln Blood is the log of the number of blood donations per
1000 inhabitants in 2002; ln Volunteers is the log of the number of volunteers in non-prot institutions per 100,000
inhabitants in 2000; Principal comp. is the rst principal component of the above mentioned three proxies of civic
capital. We also include as a control lnPopulation density, which is the log of provincial population density aver-
aged over the period 1995-2003. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. ***,**,* denote signicance
at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
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Table 9: IV regressions
Panel A: Second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turnout Blood Volunteers Principal comp. Principal comp.
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
FO -8.077** -2.624** -3.651** -0.713*** -2.151
(3.840) (1.058) (1.745) (0.267) (1.984)
FO  lnTurnout 1.701**
(0.862)
FO  lnBlood 0.524**
(0.249)
FO  lnVolunteers 0.338*
(0.178)
FO  Principal comp. 0.117** 0.130*
(0.056) (0.073)
FO  lnPopulation density 0.090** 0.110*** 0.115* 0.104** 0.098*
(0.040) (0.042) (0.060) (0.044) (0.057)
FO  lnUniversity graduates 0.152
(0.240)
FO  lnLength of trials 0.170
(0.250)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.354 0.353 0.351 0.355 0.355
Obs. 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954
Panel B: First stage
FO  lnYears of indep. 0.023*** 0.075*** 0.117*** 0.337*** 0.222***
(0.009) (0.023) (0.043) (0.103) (0.053)
FO 4.496*** 4.187*** 9.544*** 2.426* 21.132***
(0.095) (0.292) (0.689) (1.394) (4.611)
FO  lnPopulation density -0.025 -0.119* -0.202 -0.484 -0.567***
(0.022) (0.060) (0.128) (0.294) (0.176)
FO  lnUniversity graduates 0.589
(0.502)
FO  lnLength of trials -2.735***
(0.621)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial R2 0.371 0.325 0.247 0.411 0.293
F -stat. of excluded instrument 7.35 10.75 7.43 10.61 17.49
Obs. 1954 1954 1954 1954 1954
Note: The table presents the results of IV estimates. Fixed eects for each 2-digit industry, each province, and each time
period are included. Panel A presents the second stage with the change in log TFP, !ijst, as the dependent variable.
Panel B presents the rst stage where the dependent variable is, respectively: the interaction of the log of Turnout, average
electoral turnout in referenda between 1946 and 1987, and FO (column 1); the interaction of the log of Blood, number of
blood donations per 1000 inhabitants in 2002, and FO (column 2); the interaction of the log of Volunteers, number of vol-
unteers in non-prot institutions per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000, and FO (column 3); the interaction of Principal comp.,
the rst principal component of the three above mentioned proxies of civic capital, and FO (columns 4 and 5). Years of
indep. is the weighted provincial average of the number of years the cities were independent during the Middle Age, with
weights given by cities' population in 1871. Population density is provincial population density, averaged over the period
1995-2003. University graduates is the share of provincial population holding a university degree in 2001; Length of trials
is the number of days at the provincial level needed to complete a rst degree trial, averaged over the period 1995-2003.
Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. ***,**,* denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
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Foreign ownership, rm performance, and the geography of civic
capital: Online supplementary material
Matthias Burker, Chiara Franco, G. Alfredo Minerva
This appendix contains online supplementary material for our paper titled \Foreign ownership, rm perfor-
mance, and the geography of civic capital".
A Results from some other regressions
A.1 Various checks
Column (1) in Table A shows what happens when we saturate our equation with many provincial covariates
interacted with civic capital. In addition to population density, university graduates and the length of civil trials
we add to the model the total labor market participation rate. In this case the statistical signicance of the
interaction term of foreign ownership and civic capital disappears. We nd this regression of limited interest.
While the point estimate of the interaction between civic capital and FO is 0.077, and hence very close to the
estimate of 0.073 in column (5) of Table 4 in the baseline model, the statistical signicance is much lower due
to a large standard error. This is pointing to a signicant multicollinearity among regressors, and it is what we
expected to happen after adding more and more controls. In the paper, we prefer to present the results from
more parsimonious specications. Due to the structure of the econometric model, the multicollinearity problem
is particularly severe in our case, because all provincial regressors are interacted with the same FO variable.
This introduces a strong correlation among covariates.
In column (2) of Table A we estimate a specication where we have regional (NUTS 2) xed eects instead of
provincial (NUTS 3) xed eects. This allows introducing the variable in level of provincial civic capital in the
righthand side, along with other regressors in levels. The variable in level of civic capital captures whether the
change in productivity over the three-year period for rms that do not experience a change in foreign ownership
status (FO = 0) is related in some manner to civic capital. It turns out that TFP dynamics for these rms
is not related in a statistically signicant manner to local civic capital. We replicate the same exercise with a
wider array of provincial covariates in column (3) and get the same results. Estimates in columns (2) and (3)
of Table A are very close to those in column (5) of Table 4 and column (3) of Table 7. Stability of coecients
under dierent specications is nice.
In the paper we assume that, conditional on our set of regressors, the correlation between the change in
foreign ownership status, FOit, and the error term ijst is zero. This assumption is satised if E(ijst j
FOi; i) = 0, where FOi is the vector of FOit for all t's, a condition known as strict exogeneity. Strict
exogeneity is violated when foreign acquisitions (FOit = 1) follow positive shocks to the error term (ijst 1 >
0). Wooldridge (2002) proposes a simple regression-based test to verify whether FOit and ijst 1 are really
uncorrelated. We describe the procedure in footnote 21 in the paper. In column (4) of Table A we report the
estimates of this regression-based test. It turns out that the coecient on FOit is not statistically dierent
from zero, and so we are condent that foreign acquisitions are uncorrelated with past realizations of the error
term.
A.2 Regressions at the level of Local Labor Systems
In Table B we experiment with a dierent geography level and dierent data for the computation of civicness.
We use a specication where civic capital is computed at the level of the 686 Italian Local Labor Systems
(LLSs). To do so, we compute two new proxies for civicness, because data on the original proxies employed
in the paper are unavailable at this more detailed level of geography. The rst new proxy is the number of
non-prot organizations (i.e., the number of plants in the 4-digit industry 9133 \Activities of other membership
organizations n.e.c." from Istat Census 2001) for each LLS, normalized by the population of the LLS. The
second is LLS's turnout in the 1996 political elections. Results in columns (1) and (2) of Table B show that,
although the point estimates are positive as expected, they are not statistically signicant. The same result is
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obtained in column (3) when we compute the principal component of these two variables. In these regressions
we always have LLS xed eects.
In columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table B we replicate the regressions with the same variables (non-prot
organizations, turnout in 1996 political elections, and their rst principal component), computed this time at
the provincial level. Correspondingly, these regressions incorporate provincial population density and province
xed eects. Results show that the number of non-prot organizations is still not signicant statistically
(probably because it is an imperfect measure of civicness). On the contrary, turnout in 1996 political elections
is signicant at the 5% level. This is reassuring, and it is consistent with the fact that the referenda turnout
we are employing in the paper (see column (2) in Table 4) and turnout in political elections are known to be
positively correlated. So, it is natural to get similar results also in terms of statistical signicance from these
two related variables. We are left with explaining why turnout in political elections is working less satisfactorily
when it is disaggregated at the LLS level. We think this is due to the idiosyncratic nature of turnout in
political elections when it is measured on a small spatial scale such as LLSs. The presence of candidates to
the national Parliament with strong ties to the LLS (for example, a candidate living in the territory of the
LLS, or particularly popular there) may had spurred an abnormally high level of turnout in some areas. An
intense participation to elections based on strong personal ties to the candidate does not t our denition of
civic capital and our conceptual framework, since it relies more on the so-called bonding social capital than
on civic engagement and concern for the common good. Abnormally high levels of participation in some LLSs
are attenuated by aggregation at the provincial level. All this may account for the discrepancy in terms of
statistical signicance between LLS and provincial regressions.
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